|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **TABLE 5 Military Party is a Stabilizing Factor for Regimes** | | |
|  | Dependent Variable: | |
|  |  | |
|  | Regime Duration | |
|  | **Model 5.1** | **Model 5.2** |
|  | | |
| *Independent Variable:* |  |  |
| Military Party | -1.6\*\*\* |  |
|  | (0.4) |  |
|  |  |  |
| Majority |  | -1.9\*\*\* |
|  |  | (0.5) |
|  |  |  |
| *Control Variable:* |  |  |
| GDP | -0.1\*\* | -0.1\* |
|  | (0.04) | (0.04) |
|  |  |  |
| GDP per Capita | 0.2\*\* | 0.1 |
|  | (0.1) | (0.1) |
|  |  |  |
| GDP Growth | -0.004 | -0.01 |
|  | (0.02) | (0.02) |
|  |  |  |
| Military Expenditure | -0.2\*\*\* | -0.2\*\* |
|  | (0.1) | (0.1) |
|  |  |  |
| OPEC | -1.0\*\* | -0.8\* |
|  | (0.4) | (0.5) |
|  |  |  |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.02\*\* | 0.01\* |
|  | (0.01) | (0.01) |
|  |  |  |
| (Region) |  |  |
| Asia | 1.1\* | 0.8 |
|  | (0.6) | (0.6) |
|  |  |  |
| Europe | 1.3 | 1.5 |
|  | (0.9) | (0.9) |
|  |  |  |
| Latin America | 0.6\* | 0.4 |
|  | (0.4) | (0.4) |
|  |  |  |
|  | | |
| Observations | 64 | 64 |
| R2 | 0.6 | 0.5 |
| Max. Possible R2 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Log Likelihood | -168.6 | -171.6 |
| Wald Test (df = 10) | 37.0\*\*\* | 33.0\*\*\* |
| LR Test (df = 10) | 54.5\*\*\* | 48.5\*\*\* |
| Score (Logrank) Test (df = 10) | 41.5\*\*\* | 37.4\*\*\* |
|  | | |
| *Note: All models in this table are Cox Models. Positive coefficients reflect estimated effects that increase hazard rates of collapse. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05.* | | |